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INTRODUCTION 
On 1 May 2004, eight east European transition countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia – joined the European 
Union (EU). Bulgaria and Romania hope to become members in 2007.1 In many respects, this 
poses great challenges for both the new member states and the EU as a whole, one of which is 
the future shape of the European financial system. 
The aim of this paper is to consider the likely effects of the ongoing integration process for 
the new members’ financial sectors. In particular, the paper discusses the concentration of 
financial services and the dominance of foreign-owned financial institutions in providing 
financial services to small and medium-sized enterprises in the accession countries (ACs). 
Financial integration is understood as financial markets becoming increasingly intertwined 
and alike. While integration is likely to spur the efficiency of the financial intermediaries and 
markets of financially less developed countries, this paper argues that the restructuring of the 
ACs’ financial sectors could have serious effects for the financing of small local businesses. 
The reasoning is as follows: competition within financial markets does not produce results 
similar to those in ordinary business. Instead, competition can lead to a concentration in 
banking (Chick 2000). The central importance of banking is its relationship with other 
businesses. If the banking sector becomes more concentrated and dominated by foreign banks 
– a process that can already be observed in the ACs – large companies will become favoured 
recipients of loans and other services whereas small and medium companies, especially in 
peripheral regions, will find it more difficult to get funding. While larger firms will find much 
more favourable financing conditions as they can raise funds both domestically and overseas, 
the majority of small and medium-sized firms might not be able to do so. Since these firms 
are important for economic growth and need to raise capital, this could prove to be a costly 
outcome for the ACs. 
Using enterprise data on 2,427 firms, this paper finds that access to finance still constitutes a 
major problem for business development in the ACs. In addition, financing conditions are 
considerably more difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises than for larger entities. 
The large-bank barriers hypothesis and the foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis (Berger, 
Klapper and Udell 2001) argue that the way the ACs’ banking systems have evolved over the 
past decade, i.e. the banking systems being dominated by large, foreign-owned banks, could 
pose serious constraints on the development of small businesses. Further, these businesses 
may not benefit as much from financial integration as will larger firms. 
This paper is structured as follows: the next section briefly discusses the links between 
financial integration, financial development and economic growth. Section two looks at how 
the ACs’ financial systems have integrated into the EU financial markets. It particularly 
investigates the role of foreign banks. This is followed by a discussion of potential 
consequences of the ongoing integration process on the ACs’ financial markets and the 
financing conditions of small businesses in section three. Section four concludes. 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, the term “accession countries” is being used for the ten transition countries 
listed above. Cyprus and Malta who also joined the EU on 1 May 2004 have not been considered. 
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1  FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
 ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A common presumption in the literature on financial integration is that it spurs financial 
development in the less financially developed regions or countries of the integrating area. The 
financial systems and their degree of sophistication should therefore become more similar, in 
the sense that the less developed financial sectors catch up and move towards the standards of 
the most financially developed sectors. Financial integration should thus increase the supply 
of finance in the more backward regions. This should be reflected in an expansion of the 
national financial systems of these countries (Gianetti et al., 2002). 
There are basically two ways by which integration could have an effect on the development of 
national financial markets. Firstly, financial integration is expected to improve the efficiency 
of the financial intermediaries and markets of the less financially developed countries. As 
integration facilitates the actual or potential market entry of foreign institutions to the 
financially less developed market, domestic institutions will find themselves exposed to 
increased competitive pressure from more sophisticated and cheaper foreign intermediaries. 
Foreign institutions may choose to enter the market via direct penetration or cross-border 
acquisitions of intermediaries. Banks that extend their operations abroad are likely to be 
among the most efficient in their home country and can be expected to outperform the local 
banks. This is likely to set new standards in management and efficiency, and enhance the 
quality and range of financial products offered. Domestic institutions will increasingly face 
pressure to improve their own efficiency by cost-cutting and organisational restructuring to 
secure profitability. The competitive pressure should thus erode the local banks’ rents and 
lead to a more efficient financial market with better credit conditions for firms and 
households. 
Secondly, as a rule, financial integration would require an improvement in the regulation and 
supervision of the national financial market. Issues such as banking supervision, corporate 
governance, accounting standards and auditing procedures need to be brought in line with best 
practices in the integrating area to guarantee a “level playing field” (Gianetti et al., 2002,  
p. 13). An improvement in the regulatory standards of less developed financial markets 
should not only reduce the vulnerability of these markets, but may also help to promote their 
development by reducing adverse selection as well as the distortions induced by inadequate 
regulation. 
There is a firm consensus nowadays that a well-functioning financial sector is a precondition 
for an efficient allocation of resources and the exploitation of an economy’s growth potential 
(Thiel, 2001). While there is still an ongoing debate on the exact transmission channels from 
finance to economic activity, and its quantitative impact in particular, a large and growing 
amount of empirical research has documented a robust correlation between finance and 
growth and a causality running from financial development to economic growth.2 
The economic literature highlights three main channels by which financial development can 
affect growth (Pagano, 1993). Firstly, a more efficient financial system reduces the cost of 
financial intermediation and hence raises the fraction of savings funnelled to investment. The 
more efficient the transformation of savings into investment, the lesser the loss of resources, 
and the more savings are channelled towards productive investment (Thiel, 2001, p. 17). 
Competition and increased efficiency should bring interest-rate margins down, and the 
availability of credit to firms and households should correspondingly tend to increase. 
                                                 
2 For a survey of the finance-growth nexus and a more detailed discussion see Pagano (1993), Thiel 
(2001), Gianetti et al. (2002) and Levine (2003). 
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Secondly, a well-functioning financial sector is a precondition for the efficient allocation of 
resources, and improvements in financial intermediation may ameliorate the allocation of 
resources across investment projects. A better trading, hedging and pooling of risks allows the 
funding of highly profitable, but risky investment projects that would be relinquished 
otherwise. The more advanced financial systems become, the better they should be able to 
deal with the problems of asymmetric information that are persistent in financial markets. 
This should further reduce the cost of financial intermediation. Moreover, a more 
sophisticated financial sector should be more capable of distinguishing between good and bad 
investment opportunities, increasing the social marginal productivity of capital (Gianetti et 
al., 2002, pp. 7-8). 
A third way by which financial development could affect economic growth is through 
influencing households’ savings rate. While the effect in the two channels mentioned before is 
generally positive, it is ambiguous in this case. A higher efficiency of the financial system 
should yield more favourable return-risk combinations for savers. But it is not clear whether 
or not the prospects of higher returns or lower risk on savings would induce households to 
save more, which in turn would stimulate higher economic growth. 
In addition to a potentially positive effect on the development of national financial markets, 
the process of financial integration might also enhance each country’s access to the financial 
markets of other countries of the integration area. In particular, it is quite possible that, as 
financial integration proceeds, the most financially developed countries will share the services 
provided by their financial systems with the other integrating countries (Gianetti et al., 2002, 
p. 14). Economies of scale and external economies may give an incentive to established 
intermediaries of the more developed markets to provide cross-border loans and other 
financial services to the firms of less advanced countries. Also, firms of less developed 
countries might bypass their home country’s securities markets and instead seek listings in the 
major financial centres. 
 4
2 FINANCIAL INTEGRATION OF THE NEW EU MEMBER 
 STATES INTO THE EU-15’s FINANCIAL MARKET 
There are a number of ways to measure financial integration. A summary volume-based 
measure of international financial integration (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003, p. 86) is 
(1) IFIGDPit = (FAit + FLit) / GDPit , 
where IFIGDPit stands for international financial integration for country i at time t and FA 
and FL refer to the stocks of aggregate foreign assets and liabilities, respectively.3 Figure 1 
shows that, according to this broad measure, the ACs’ financial integration into the world 
economy has increased markedly over the past decade (with the exception of Bulgaria where 
the ratio has been relatively high anyway). We will later see that EU financial markets play a 
particularly important role in this process. 
 
Figure 1: IFIGDP 
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Source: IFS. 
 
The following section aims to measure the degree of integration of the ACs’ financial sectors 
into EU financial markets. This is done by using several quantitative and qualitative indicators 
proposed in the literature on financial market integration. One difficulty is data availability 
and reliability, which impedes the application of some more sophisticated methodologies. 
Given the still relatively low market capitalisation in the ACs, indicators looking at the 
integration of security markets have only limited explanatory power (especially as the short 
                                                 
3 This data on countries’ portfolios of external assets and liabilities – the so-called international 
investment position – summarise total holdings by domestic residents of financial claims on the rest of 
the world and non-residents’ claims on the domestic economy. External liabilities are divided into four 
main categories: foreign direct investment, portfolio investment (equity and debt securities), financial 
derivatives, and other investment (monetary authorities, general government, banks, and other 
sectors). Assets constitute the same four categories as liabilities, plus official reserves. 
 5
time period for which data are available does not allow for extensive statistical analyses). The 
study will hence focus – although not exclusively – on indicators relating to the banking 
sectors. 
The indicators applied fall into the following five categories: 
• indicators relating to the development of the domestic financial sectors 
• indicators of stock and bond market integration 
• interest rate differentials to analyse the degree of convergence in the money market 
• indicators relating to institutional conditions that may induce financial market segmentation 
(legal and institutional framework) 
• indicators unfolding the role of foreign banks. 
Throughout the following sections, the EU-15 and the euro area (EU-15 without Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK) will be used as a benchmark. However, it has to be recognised that 
western European countries still differ considerably in the degree of financial development 
and are far from having achieved full integration. Also, financial markets in the EU are 
subject to change themselves, and taking them as a benchmark therefore implies that this 
benchmark is a moving target (Padoa-Schioppa, 2001, p. 7). 
 
2.1 MEASURES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1.1  SIZE MEASURES 
If financial integration increases the supply of finance in the financially less developed 
countries of the integrating area, as just discussed, this should be reflected in an expansion of 
the financial systems of these countries.4 The size of national financial systems (relative to 
GDP) should hence accelerate in the financially less developed countries (Gianetti et al., 
2002, p. 12). This requires two qualifications. Firstly, one should not expect financial 
integration to fully equalise the degree of financial development within the integrating area 
because institutional, informational and cultural (including language) barriers may prevent 
market forces to completely level the field. Furthermore, the literature on economic 
geography and centre-periphery models challenges static equilibrium theory. These models 
argue that economic integration might not always cause spatial differences to narrow.5 
Secondly, because financial integration is likely to improve access to other financial markets 
of the integrating area, domestic clients might choose to “by-pass” the financial market of 
their home country. If domestic firms and households finance themselves through foreign 
                                                 
4 One qualification needs to be made with respect to the link between financial integration and 
financial development. While it is reasonable to assume that financial integration spurs financial 
development, for the reasons discussed in section one, it certainly is not the only reason for financial 
development. Starting from a very low level of financial development, characterised by mono-
banking-systems and almost non-existent capital markets, the central and eastern European transition 
countries have undergone major structural changes in their movement from centrally planned to 
market-based economies. This process had and still has its own dynamics. Slovenia’s banking sector, 
for example, improved significantly without much financial integration. However, as different regions 
or countries of the integrating area become more similar during the process of financial integration, the 
use of measures of financial development as approximations for the degree of integration is sensible. 
5 Theories of geographic dualism actually argue that in some cases regional economic differences 
might even widen over time. See, for example, the contributions of Myrdal (1957), Krugman (1991) 
and Thirlwall (2000). 
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financial markets, this will not show up in measures of domestic financial development. 
These measures are therefore only a rough indicator of financial integration, and other 
indicators such as the magnitude of cross-border activity should be looked at (see section 2.5). 
One widely used indicator of the size of financial intermediation is the private credit provided 
by deposit money banks and other institutions, divided by GDP. Figure 2 shows that while the 
ratio has modestly increased over the years 1999-2002 in most ACs, claims on the private 
sector are still fairly low, compared with an average of 109 per cent for the euro area for 
2002. On average the share of the ACs’ domestic private sector credit to GDP amounts to less 
than a third of that of the euro area. 
 
Figure 2: Private sector credit as a percentage of GDP 
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Source: IFS. 
 
The Czech Republic and Slovak Republic experienced a sharp decline in the ratio of private 
credit to GDP over the three-year period. This decline is primarily due to major restructurings 
in the banking sectors and a tackling of the problem of non-performing loans.6 In the Slovak 
Republic, for example, the authorities launched a programme at the end of 1999 to 
recapitalise the three large state-owned banks and address their problem loans. These “big 
three” had serious problems in loan quality, with non-performing loans accounting for more 
than half of their total lending. The restructurings reduced the amount of non-performing 
loans to 18 per cent of the big three’s total loans by the end of 2000.7 Similarly, the Czech 
                                                 
6 Another major effect was the Czech currency crisis of 1997. 
7 Together with two other smaller state-owned banks, the big three held 47 per cent of the total assets 
of the national banking sector in 1999. Besides a direct equity infusion of SKK 18.9 billion in 
December 1999, the restructuring programme included a carve-out of bad assets in two steps at the 
end of 1999 and June 2000. In total, SKK 105 billion (12 per cent of GDP) was transferred to the 
Slovak Consolidation Agency and Konsolidačná Banka and replaced by government bonds. 
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Republic strengthened prudential controls and fostered the transfers of bad loans to a 
consolidation bank (Konsolidacni banka). This resulted in the share of non-performing loans 
in the overall loan portfolio of commercial banks decreasing significantly (OECD, 2001, pp. 
138-142).8 
While these factors largely explain the decrease in outstanding credit to the private sector in 
the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, the problem of non-performing loans is also one of 
the reasons why banks in the other countries were rather reluctant to expand lending to private 
firms.9 Furthermore, in preparing for privatisation, many banks showed risk-averse behaviour. 
 
Figure 3: Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (end-year) 
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Source: S&P/IFC Emerging Markets Database. 
 
The most commonly used measures of the size of a country’s financial market are its stock 
and bond market capitalisation in relation to GDP. The more developed a country’s capital 
markets, the easier it should be to fund new investment projects. Figure 3 shows the end-year 
stock market capitalisation, i.e. the value of listed shares, in the ACs for the years 1996 to 
2003. It is apparent that even though marked capitalisation relative to GDP shows some form 
of increase for most countries, the levels are still very low. Moreover, given the relatively low 
levels of GDP per capita of the ACs, market capitalisation in absolute terms is particularly 
low. As an illustration, the total stock market capitalisation of the ACs amounted to  
US$ 93,397 million at the end of 2003. This was only 1.2 per cent of the total stock market 
capitalisation of the western European countries (which, according to the World Federation of 
Exchanges, was around US$ 7,820 billion in December 2003). In an international context 
                                                                                                                                                        
Furthermore, to maintain healthy balance sheets in the run-up to privatisation, the financial authorities 
imposed strict controls on the banks (OECD, 2002, pp. 116-119). 
8 Table 5 in section 2.1.2 provides an overview on the share of non-performing loans relative to total 
bank loans for all ACs. 
9 The issue of bank lending to the private sector is revisited in detail in section three. 
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only the equity markets of Poland and, to a lesser extent, of the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
play some role (Caviglia et al., 2002, p. 21).10 
Similarly, the role of domestic bond markets has been rather limited. As with equity markets, 
only the Polish, Czech and Hungarian bond markets play some role in an international 
context. The size of the ACs’ domestic bond markets in relation to GDP is still fairly small. 
This is largely due to relatively low levels of outstanding government securities, a result of 
low government debt. Gross total government debts relative to GDP range from a mere 5 per 
cent in Estonia to 58 per cent in Hungary in 2003.11 The relatively low level of government 
securities that could serve as a benchmark for corporate bonds is commonly regarded as a 
major constraint to the development of the corporate bond market. 
 
Figure 4: Spread between lending and deposit rate (in per cent) 
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Source: IFS. 
Note: Data for Romania are not available. 
 
2.1.2  EFFICIENCY MEASURES 
A second kind of indicator used to describe financial development relates to the efficiency 
with which funds are channelled to investment projects (Gianetti et al., 2002, p. 10). Two 
commonly used efficiency measures are the spread between lending and deposit rates and the 
share of overhead costs in the bank’s total assets. Both are approximations of the costs of 
                                                 
10 With a market capitalisation of US$ 36,723 million at the end of 2003, the size of the Polish stock 
market is comparable to the size of the smallest euro area stock market (Luxembourg with a market 
capitalisation of US$ 37,333 million). Market capitalisation in the Czech Republic is US$ 17,232 
million and US$ 16,689 million in Hungary. The markets of the remaining ACs (with an average stock 
market capitalisation of US$ 3,251 million) are negligible in an international context (S&P/IFC). 
11 The unweighted average of 32 per cent for all ACs is well below the debt ratio of 60 per cent 
required for membership in the European Monetary Union. 
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financial intermediation. Other indicators include a banking sector’s average return on assets, 
the average return on equity, and the amount of non-performing loans.12 
Figure 4 and table 1 show a general downside trend in the spreads in most countries, 
indicating that banks in the ACs have significantly improved their efficiency in financial 
intermediation in recent years. Hungary and the Slovak Republic have already converged to 
the level of the euro area, and Estonia and the Czech Republic have come very close as well. 
 
Table 1: Spread between lending and deposit rate (in per cent) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bulgaria na na 10.3 9.6 8.4 8.2 6.6 5.9 
Czech Republic 5.8 5.5 4.7 4.2 3.7 4.1 4.0 3.9 
Estonia 8.8 5.6 7.0 6.9 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.1 
Hungary 8.7 4.9 4.9 4.4 3.1 3.7 2.8 na 
Latvia 14.1 9.4 9.0 9.2 7.5 5.9 4.7 2.4 
Lithuania 7.6 6.5 6.2 8.2 8.3 6.6 5.1 4.6 
Poland 6.1 5.6 6.3 5.8 5.8 6.6 5.9 na 
Slovak Republic 4.6 5.2 4.9 6.7 6.4 4.8 3.6 3.1 
Slovenia 7.5 6.8 5.6 5.1 5.7 5.2 4.9 4.8 
Euro area 4.8 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 na 
Source: IFS. 
Note: Data for Romania are not available. 
 
Tables 2-4 show the overhead costs of banks as a percentage of total banking assets, the 
average return on assets (ROA), and the average return on equity (ROE) respectively.13 A 
distinction is made between foreign-owned banks (FB) and domestic-owned banks (DB). As 
expected, foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic-owned banks.14 This may be 
due to “cherry-picking”, i.e. foreign banks acquiring the most efficient banks, or due to 
banking and managing experience foreign banks bring with them and transfer to their 
subsidiaries. 
 
                                                 
12 For a more elaborate analysis of cost efficiency of banks at bank level in transition countries see, for 
example, Fries and Taci (2004). 
13 The ROA is an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. It is calculated as 
the net income in relation to total assets of a bank. The ROE is the ratio of a corporation’s net income 
relative to its equity. 
14 This notion is also supported in empirical studies. In a study that examines the cost efficiency of 289 
banks in 15 east European countries, Fries and Taci (2004) find that privatised banks with a majority 
foreign ownership are more efficient than domestic-owned banks. In addition banking systems with a 
higher foreign penetration have lower costs. In a comparative analysis of the performance of foreign-
owned and domestic-owned banks operating in the Czech Republic and Poland, Weill (2003) also 
finds that on average foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic-owned banks. 
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Table 2: Overhead costs of banks relative to total banking assets (in per cent) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB 
Czech Republic 2.2 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.4 2.1 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.5 
Estonia na 6.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 
Hungary 2.6 3.3 2.4 3.6 2.8 3.7 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.6 
Lithuania na na 0.0 6.5 5.8 6.3 4.1 5.5 4.0 4.2 3.6 4.0 3.1 3.7 
Slovenia 4.6 2.7 3.8 3.3 2.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.1 
Sources: National Central Banks (published as table 19c in ECB, 2004, p. 48). 
Note: FB (foreign banks), DB (domestic banks). 
 
Table 3: Return on assets of foreign and domestic banks (in per cent) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB 
Czech 
Republic 0.3 0.3 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.2 0.8 -0.5 0.6 -0.7 0.6 -0.8 0.8 0.1 
Estonia na 0.0 -2.0 2.0 -1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 -2.0 -24.0 2.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 
Hungary 2.4 0.6 4.9 0.9 4.1 0.9 1.9 0.5 0.8 -7.0 0.1 1.3 1.1 1.4 
Lithuania 0.0 na 0.0 -2.9 2.9 -2.4 1.5 -2.3 1.5 0.4 2.1 -1.0 1.2 -0.4 
Poland na na 5.0 na 6.6 na na na na na na na na na 
Slovenia -0.8 0.5 -0.1 1.1 0.5 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.2 -0.1 0.8 0.1 1.3 
Sources: National Central Banks (published as table 19a in ECB, 2004, p. 47) 
 
Table 4: Return on equity of foreign and domestic banks (in per cent) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB FB DB 
Czech 
Republic 4.2 2.9 8.5 -6.5 9.4 3.1 13.3 -7.3 9.1 -11 7.9 -14 10.6 1.9 
Estonia na 5.0 na 19.0 na 23.0 na 23.0 -10 -21 14.0 -9.0 9.0 9.0 
Hungary na na 44.6 12.4 31.3 20.8 na na na na na na na na 
Lithuania na na 0.0 -53 21.7 -64 12.9 -91 8.2 3.7 14.9 -13 11.3 -5.3 
Poland na na 315 na 51 na na na na na na na na na 
Slovenia 4.2 2.9 8.5 -6.5 9.4 3.1 13.3 -7.3 9.1 -11 7.9 -14 10.6 1.9 
Sources: National Central Banks (published as table 19b in ECB, 2004, p. 47) 
 
An indicator of banks’ allocative efficiency is the amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) in 
their balance sheets. Table 5 shows that, with the exception of Poland, Slovenia and 
Bulgaria,15 banks in the ACs have improved the quality of their loan portfolios markedly. The 
                                                 
15 The high level of NPLs in Poland is related to the current legislation which makes it difficult for 
banks to write off bad loans. As a consequence they have to keep these loans on their books for a long 
time. The legislation is about to change. Similarly, the high level of bad loans in Bulgaria is due to a 
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efforts of the Czech and Slovak Republic to tackle the problem of NPLs have already been 
mentioned. And while both countries still have a way to go until their banking sectors have 
cleaned up their loan portfolios, they have already managed to cut the amount of NPLs by 
almost two-thirds and three-quarters, respectively, between 1995 and 2002. 
 
Table 5: Non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria 12.5 15.2 13.0 11.8 17.5 10.9 7.9 10.4 
Czech 
Republic 26.6 21.8 19.9 20.3 21.5 19.3 13.7 9.4 
Estonia 2.5 2.0 2.1 4.0 2.9 1.3 1.2 0.8 
Hungary na na 6.6 7.9 4.4 3.1 2.9 4.6 
Latvia 19.0 20.0 10.0 6.8 6.8 5.0 3.1 2.1 
Lithuania 17.3 32.2 28.3 12.5 11.9 10.8 7.4 5.8 
Poland 23.9 14.7 11.5 11.8 14.5 16.8 20.1 24.6 
Romania 37.9 48.0 56.5 58.5 35.4 3.8 3.4 2.3 
Slovak 
Republic 41.3 31.8 33.4 44.3 32.9 26.2 24.3 11.2 
Slovenia 9.3 10.1 10.0 9.5 9.3 9.3 10.1 na 
EU-15 na na na 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.9 
Sources: EBRD country database and ECB. 
 
The efficiency indicators applied in this section show an overall trend of improving banking 
efficiency. This supports the notion that the proceeding transition process towards market-
oriented economies and the process of European financial integration have benefited the 
development of the ACs’ banking sectors. 
Different measures of efficiency are also being used with respect to capital markets, such as 
stock market turnover as an indicator of market liquidity. Because capital markets are little 
used as a source of finance in the ACs, we will refrain from analysing these kinds of measures 
in this paper. The next section, however, takes a look at stock and bond market integration. 
 
2.2 STOCK AND BOND MARKET INTEGRATION 
Not only are the stock markets of the ACs very small in both relative and absolute size, they 
also show little correlation with the world and western European equity markets, as can be 
easily seen from figure 5. This is largely due to the low stock market turnover. We thus 
refrain from any quantitative analysis. 
A more instructive approach relates to the strategies by which stock exchanges and policy-
makers in the ACs try to become competitive for a single European market for financial 
services (see also section 2.4). As noted before, only the stock markets of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland are somewhat relevant in an international context. The future of many 
stock exchanges in the ACs remains unclear, and might even be at stake as large corporations 
continue to seek foreign listing and as trading is diverted abroad (cf. Claessens et al., 2003). 
The ACs’ stock exchanges are aware of these threats and try to respond in different ways, for 
example by strengthening their listing standards, trading systems and corporate governance 
standards. Another strategy is to create alliances with other stock exchanges in Europe. 
Following the examples of NOREX and Euronext, the Finnish HEX stock exchange group 
                                                                                                                                                        
more restrictive definition of NPLs. In general, definitions of NPLs vary across countries. Hence the 
figures presented here are not fully comparable. 
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has acquired strategic ownership of the Tallinn Stock Exchange in Estonia in April 2001 and 
the Riga Stock Exchange in Latvia in August 2002, creating a common trading environment 
for Baltic securities. Another example of establishing alliances with stock exchanges in 
western Europe is the Warsaw Stock Exchange, which tried to build ties through (minority) 
shareholdings in EURONEXT Paris S.A. and Deutsche Börse AG. 
 
Figure 5: MSCI equity indices January 1997 - December 2003 
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Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). 
 
A trend for foreign listing is also observable in the bond markets. As domestic bond markets 
are largely underdeveloped in the ACs, both governments and large corporations frequently 
place bonds in international markets. The ACs’ total international bond issues have reached 
the considerable volume of US$ 5,619 million in 2002 (cf. figure 6). 
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Figure 6: International bond issues by ACs (in US$ million) 
 
Source: Dealogic (Bondware). 
 
2.3 INTERBANK MARKET RATES AS AN INDICATOR FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 CONVERGENCE IN THE MONEY MARKET 
The integration of markets entails an increase in transactions and a tendency for prices in 
those markets to converge. In terms of international financial integration this would imply an 
increase in capital flows and a tendency for prices and returns on traded financial assets in 
different countries to converge (De Brouwer, 1997). Full integration of money markets would 
imply that interbank market rates should converge. Figure 7 shows a general downward trend 
in the interbank market rates in the ACs, with rates moving closer to both Western European 
benchmarks, the LIBOR and EURIBOR. 
 
Figure 7: 3 month interbank offer rates 1999-2003 (in per cent, monthly averages) 
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Table 6 shows the correlation between the interbank rates of the respective ACs with LIBOR 
for the whole period of 1999-2003. The correlation is relatively high for Latvia, Slovenia and 
Poland. The Czech Republic and Estonia show some correlation, while there is hardly any 
correlation for Hungary and Lithuania, and even a negative for the Slovak Republic. 
 
Table 6: Correlation between 3 month interbank offer rates and LIBOR 1999-2003 
 Slovak 
Republic 
Hungary Czech 
Republic 
Latvia Slovenia Estonia Lithuania Poland 
 BRIBOR BUBOR PRIBOR RIGIBOR SITIBOR TALIBOR VILIBOR WIBOR 
Years and 
number of 
observ-
ations  
1999-
2003 
 
1,137 
1999-
2003 
 
1,139 
1999-
2003 
 
1,150 
2000-
2003 
 
896 
2002-
2003 
 
402 
1999-
2003 
 
1,132 
1999- 
2003 
 
1,143 
1999-
2003 
 
1,144 
Correlation -0.18 0.09 0.35 0.68 0.88 0.41 0.12 0.81 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 7 shows the same correlations, but separately for the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 
2003. Integration would imply increasing correlations between the respective interbank rates 
and the LIBOR, as is the case with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia. 
 
Table 7: Annual correlation between 3-month interbank offer rates and LIBOR 1999-
2003 
 Slovak 
Republic 
Hungary Czech 
Republic 
Latvia Slovenia Estonia Lithuania Poland
 BRIBOR BUBOR PRIBOR RIGIBOR SITIBOR TALIBOR VILIBOR WIBOR 
1999 -0.26 -0.12 -0.20 na na -0.16 0.85 0.82 
2000 -0.84 -0.17 0.00 -0.40 na 0.96 -0.71 0.90 
2001 -0.53 0.87 0.27 -0.13 na 0.98 0.77 0.92 
2002 0.87 0.08 0.61 0.35 0.79 0.85 0.09 0.69 
2003 -0.15 -0.81 0.89 -0.53 0.93 0.96 0.86 0.93 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
2.4 INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES THAT MAY INDUCE 
 FINANCIAL MARKET SEGMENTATION 
By hindering the free movement of financial institutions and services, legal and institutional 
barriers can seriously hamper the process of financial integration.16 To eliminate such barriers 
and to fully exploit the benefits of economic integration in a borderless market with 
unrestricted movement of people, goods and services (as envisaged through the Single Market 
Act of 1985), the European Community launched the Single Market programme for financial 
services. The aim of the Single Market framework was to create a level playing field for all 
financial institutions in the common market, and to enable firms as well as individuals to take 
advantage of deeper and more liquid financial markets with a wider range of financial 
instruments and services. The integration process was based on four principles: the 
                                                 
16 Other efficiency barriers to operating across borders might include distance, differences in language, 
culture, currency, and explicit or implicit rules against foreign competitors (cf. Berger, De Young and 
Udell, 2001). 
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harmonisation of standards, home country control and supervision, the provision of a single 
European passport for financial institutions, and mutual recognition (Reszat, 2003, p. 20).17 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), adopted by the European Commission in May 
1999, outlines a series of policy objectives and specific measures to improve the Single 
Market for financial services. The FSAP aims to tackle three strategic goals, namely 
completing a single wholesale market for financial services, developing open and secure 
markets for retail financial services and ensuring the continued stability of EU financial 
markets through state-of-the-art prudential rules and supervision. 
Before accession, all ACs had to adopt the whole acquis communautaire, the common legal 
framework of the EU. The acquis includes the Maastricht Treaty, as well as a variety of 
further, detailed regulations (see Lanoo and Stirböck, 2000, pp. 286-8). In its assessments 
before accession, the European Commission has approved that all ACs (Bulgaria and 
Romania excluded) have aligned their regulatory frameworks with EU legislation to a 
sufficient extent that enables them to join the EU. Nevertheless, the ACs still need to work 
towards an effective implementation and enforcement of the acquis. Furthermore, a number 
of transitional arrangements and exemptions were concluded during accession negotiations 
(ECB, 2004, p. 53). But while the regulatory and supervisory framework still need to be 
polished, and issues such as law enforcement and accounting standards need to be 
strengthened, a great degree of harmonisation has already been achieved (Racocha, 2003, p. 
10).18 
Tables 8 and 9 show that, according to the EBRD’s transition indicators for the progress made 
in banking reform and securities markets, the present stage of the regulatory framework is 
largely satisfactory. The measurement scales for the indicators range from 1 to 4+, where 1 
represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and a 4+ represents the 
standards of an industrialised market economy (with 0.3 decimal points added or subtracted 
for + and – ratings).19 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of the institutional and regulatory framework of the European capital markets and 
the quest for a harmonisation of standards and regulations see Gros and Lannoo (2000). 
18 As mentioned before, the EU-15 standards constitute a kind of moving target, and this is particularly 
true for the regulatory and supervisory framework which is currently under review under the FSAP 
and the Lamfalussy framework. Having just adjusted more or less to the current EU framework for 
financial services, further challenges lie ahead. 
19 The classification system for the banking reform and interest rate liberalisation indicator is as 
follows: 1) Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier-system. 2) Significant liberalisation of 
interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest rate ceilings. 3) Substantial 
progress in establishing bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation; 
full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to 
private enterprises and significant presence of private banks. 4) Significant movement of banking laws 
and regulation towards BIS standards; well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential 
supervision; significant term lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening. 4+) 
Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking laws 
and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services. The 
classification system for the securities markets and non-bank financial institutions indicator is: 1) 
Little progress. 2) Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers; some trading in 
government paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the issuance and 
trading of securities. 3) Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of 
independent share registries, secure clearance and settlement procedures, and some protection of 
minority shareholders; emergence of non-bank financial institutions (e.g. investment funds, private 
insurance and pension funds, leasing companies) and associated regulatory framework. 4) Securities 
laws and regulations approaching IOSCO standards; substantial market liquidity and capitalisation; 
well-functioning non-bank financial institutions and effective regulation. 4+) Standards and 
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Table 8: Progress in banking reform and interest rate liberalisation 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bulgaria 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 
Czech Republic 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Estonia 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Hungary 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Latvia 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.7 3.7 
Lithuania 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Poland 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Romania 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Slovak Republic 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Slovenia 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003. 
 
Table 9: Progress in reform of securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bulgaria 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 
Czech Republic 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Estonia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 
Hungary 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Latvia 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.0 3.0 
Lithuania 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Poland 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Romania 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Slovak Republic 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 
Slovenia 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003. 
 
2.5 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN BANKS 
 
The measures used so far were only partly able to display the degree of financial integration 
attained hitherto. This section will look at one of the most striking features of the ACs’ 
financial systems, namely the penetration of the ACs’ banking sectors by foreign, and 
particularly western European, banks. 
A distinction can be made between two aspects of foreign banking activity: cross-border 
activities from the home country where the bank is headquartered and activities of local bank 
subsidiaries and branches in the host country. 
Annex 1.1 shows the foreign claims of BIS reporting banks on individual countries by 
nationality of reporting banks for end-September 2003.20 Foreign claims refer to claims on 
                                                                                                                                                        
performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of securities laws and 
regulations with IOSCO standards; fully developed non-bank intermediation (EBRD, 2003, p. 17). 
20 Commercial banks and other deposit-taking institutions in 27 jurisdictions report to the BIS 
consolidated banking statistics, which are estimated to cover more than 95 per cent of international 
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borrowers resident outside the country in which the bank is headquartered. Foreign claims can 
be disaggregated into cross-border claims and local claims booked by foreign offices. The 
latter refer to claims on residents of the country in which the foreign office is located. For 
example, claims on Czech residents booked by an Austrian bank’s Czech-located subsidiary 
would be reported by Austria as local claims on the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, the BIS 
consolidated banking statistics do not publish breakdown data on cross-border and local 
claims so that data on cross-border lending to the ACs are not easily available.21 The data 
presented in annexes 1.1-1.4 nevertheless are a good indicator for the importance of foreign 
bank penetration throughout the ACs and clearly show the importance of both cross-border 
finance and financing through local subsidiaries for the ACs. 
Annex 1.2 shows that, from the point of view of most BIS reporting countries, lending to the 
ACs constitutes only a very small fraction of their international exposure. For all EU-13 
countries,22 western Europe is the most important market for international banking services, 
with more than half of international lending being directed to the EU-15 countries. On 
average, only 2.3 per cent of the EU-13 countries’ foreign lending is directed towards the 
ACs. Foreign claims to the ACs have only reached a considerable size in relation to total 
international lending for Austria (15.3 per cent), and, to a lesser extent, for Italy (9.2 per cent), 
Sweden (6.7 per cent), Belgium (6.5 per cent) and Finland (5.0 per cent). In Germany – the 
single most important lender to the ACs with a total lending volume of US$ 66 billion (cf. 
annex 1.1) – lending to the ACs amounts to only 2.7 per cent of its total international lending. 
But the opposite is true for the ACs. Foreign lending from western Europe is of utmost 
importance, both in absolute and relative terms. About 86 per cent of the ACs’ total foreign 
claims come from banks headquartered in the EU-13 (cf. annex 1.1). In the Czech Republic, 
the Slovak Republic and the Baltic states even more than 90 per cent of foreign claims stem 
from EU-13 banks. Annex 1.3 shows that total foreign claims vis-à-vis the ACs equal nearly 
100 per cent of their domestic credit. This ratio is only 56 per cent for the western European 
countries, that is foreign bank penetration in the ACs is almost double compared with the old 
EU member countries. On average, foreign claims from EU-13 banks are 85 per cent relative 
to domestic credit. Total foreign claims and foreign claims from EU-13 banks respectively 
(both relative to domestic credit) are particularly high for Estonia (141.8 per cent / 138.7 per 
cent), the Czech Republic (121.8 per cent / 111.0 per cent), Lithuania (121.4 per cent / 115.2 
per cent) and Poland (116.6 per cent / 92.9 per cent). Because of the small size of the ACs’ 
banking systems, these numbers are considerably lower in relation to GDP (see annex 1.4). 
To get a more complete picture, it would be sensible to also take a look at the reverse flow of 
capital (Buch et al. 2003, p. 59). Unfortunately the BIS does not provide such data on the 
ACs’ foreign assets. However, the IFS data on aggregate external assets (which has also been 
used to calculate the IFIGDPit indicator in section two) indicate that the ACs indeed hold 
                                                                                                                                                        
banking business. For details on the compilation of the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics see BIS 
(2003). 
21 Foreign claims can also be disaggregated into international claims and local claims denominated in 
local currency, and the BIS does publish these data. However, regrettably, data for this breakdown is 
incomplete for some reporting countries, including Denmark, Germany and Ireland. As particularly 
German banks’ exposure in the region is very high, these data give an incomplete picture. To obtain 
the “true” amount of cross-border credit, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) use a combination of BIS 
and BankScope data. Following their methodology would, however, involve great efforts and would 
stand in no relation to the insights it would offer for this piece of work. We shall hence present just the 
plain BIS data on foreign claims. 
22 EU-13 comprises the EU-15 countries minus Greece and Luxembourg, whose banks are not listed in 
the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. 
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quite large foreign assets, a large share of which can be expected to be invested in western 
Europe. 
The importance of foreign banks for the ACs’ banking systems can be illustrated even more 
by looking at the actual presence of foreign banks in the host country in the form of 
subsidiaries. The ACs’ banking sectors generally consist of previously state-owned banks, 
new banks established after 1990 as private institutions, and subsidiaries and branches of 
foreign banks. While the approaches to bank privatisation differed across the ACs, the results 
are now rather comparable (Racocha, 2003, p. 5). With the exception of Slovenia, and to a 
lesser extent Poland, Latvia and Hungary,23 the banking sectors are largely dominated by 
foreign-owned institutions,24 most of which are from the “old” EU. State ownership only has a 
significant portion in Slovenia (40.7 per cent), Poland (25.3 per cent) and Lithuania (12 per 
cent) (cf. Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Bank ownership, 2002 
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Source: Czech National Bank / Racocha (2003, p. 5). 
 
Table 10 shows that the assets held by foreign-owned banks, relative to the assets of all banks, 
have increased significantly over the past decade, from an (unweighted) average of 22 per 
cent in 1996 to 71 per cent in 2002. Only Slovenia still shows a fairly low level with 17 per 
cent, the result of a cautious government attitude towards the involvement of foreign banks. 
                                                 
23 The sale of Postabank to Erste Bank of Austria in 2003 has significantly boosted the share of foreign 
ownership in Hungary. 
24 Banks are classified as foreign-owned if foreign ownership exceeds 50 per cent. 
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Table 10: Assets of foreign-owned banks relative to assets of all banks 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria na na na na na 0.32 0.43 0.75 0.73 0.75 
Czech Republic 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.66 0.90 0.86 
Estonia 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.90 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Hungary 0.09 0.13 0.37 0.43 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.65 0.84 
Latvia na na 0.35 0.51 0.71 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.43 
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.41 0.51 0.37 0.55 0.78 0.96 
Poland 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.49 0.73 0.72 0.71 
Romania na na na na 0.11 0.15 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.53 
Slovak Republic na na na 0.13 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.43 0.78 0.86 
Slovenia na 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.17 
Source: EBRD country database. 
 
As a further illustration, annex 2 lists the 20 largest banks in the ACs, of which the vast 
majority is owned by foreign banks. 
All in all, it is apparent that the ACs have become integrated into international, and especially 
European, capital markets at an impressive speed over the past decade. Market shares of 
foreign banks are much higher than in the average western European country and the ACs 
today rely to a substantial degree on international bank lending.25 
                                                 
25 See also Buch et al. (2003) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004). 
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3 CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND 
INCREASED FINANCIAL MARKET COMPETITION FOR SME 
FINANCE IN THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES 
 
The previous section has shown that the ACs’ financial sectors are already highly integrated 
with the Western European and international financial markets, particularly through the strong 
presence of foreign banks. This section now turns to potential implications of European 
financial integration for the ACs. Firstly, it will look at the financing conditions of businesses 
in the ACs, using firm level data on the business environment. It then goes on to discuss 
potential effects of the concentration of financial services and the dominance of foreign-
owned financial institutions for the provision of financial services to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the ACs. 
 
3.1 FINANCING CONDITIONS IN THE ACs 
This section uses data from the 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) which was implemented jointly by the EBRD and the World Bank. The 
BEEPS aims to investigate the extent to which government policies and practices facilitate or 
impede business activity and investment in central and eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. It also includes unique information on the access to 
finance and the financing conditions for firms in the region. The 2002 BEEPS covers 6,153 
firms in 26 transition countries and includes data on 2,427 firms from the ten ACs.26 
The results given in Table 11 indicate that, with the exception of Poland, the financing 
conditions for businesses have improved in the ACs since the first survey in 1999. This is 
what would have been hoped for, as integration should theoretically bring about an 
improvement in the less developed region (as discussed in section one). 
 
Table 11: Average score for the financing of business, 1999 and 2002 
 Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
1999 3.05 2.88 2.84 2.86 2.84 3.24 2.86 3.71 3.37 2.73 
2002 2.83 2.49 1.99 2.26 1.91 1.81 2.91 2.67 2.53 2.00 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 1999 and 2002 datasets. 
Note: The average score is based on a scale of 1 (best case) to 4 (worst case). 
 
In the following, the results of the BEEPS 2002 are looked at more closely to see whether the 
survey indicates differences in the financing conditions of SMEs and large firms, and between 
rural and urban firms. It is important to note that for the BEEPS, firms were asked to appraise 
the conditions of their business environment, and that these evaluations are subjective by 
nature. Hence the judgments of firms of different size, location and nationality cannot be 
compared at face value. Nevertheless, the BEEPS gives a best possible picture of the 
sentiment in the region. 
 
                                                 
26 For details on BEEPS see chapter two of EBRD (2002) and Fries et al. (2003). Annex 3 gives an 
overview of the dataset, including the total number of observations per country, the number of small, 
medium and large firms as well as rural and urban firms. 
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Table 12 gives the average score for all 2,427 firms that were questioned in the ACs with 
respect to access to financing (e.g. collateral required) and to the cost of financing (e.g. 
interest rates and charges) on a score from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle).27 Distinction 
with respect to geographical location does not give any clear pattern for either “access to 
finance” or “cost of finance”. Looking at the size of firms, however, shows that small firms 
(with less than 50 employees) on average find it harder to obtain financing than large firms 
(250-9,999 employees).28 The same seems to be true for the cost of financing: on average, 
smaller firms perceive the cost of financing as a greater obstacle for the operation and growth 
of their businesses than do large firms. 
 
Table 12: Access to and cost of finance, average score for all ACs 
 Access to finance Cost of finance 
For all firms 2.32 2.56 
By geographical location (city or town)   
(1) Capital 2.21 2.31 
(2) Other, over 1 million inhabitants 2.75 3.5 
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.58 2.96 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.26 2.5 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.32 2.56 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.34 2.63 
By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 2.41 2.63 
Medium (50-249 employees) 2.21 2.49 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 2.07 2.36 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
Note: The average score is based on a scale of 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle). 
 
Annex 4 presents the results by country. For the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and the 
Slovak Republic a very clear pattern for both access to and costs of bank financing emerges. 
In general, small firms seem to have greater problems in obtaining finance than medium-sized 
firms, which lag behind large firms. The evidence is somewhat mixed for the other countries, 
as medium-sized firms sometimes give worse rankings than small firms. Nevertheless, with 
the exception of Latvia, in all countries small firms on average face bigger obstacles in 
financing their businesses than larger firms. 
This pattern is confirmed by the results presented in table 13. Firms were asked how easy it 
would be for them to obtain a short-term working capital loan on commercial terms, and how 
easy it would be for them to obtain a longer term banking loan for new investment. As before, 
there is not a strong geographical pattern,29 but small firms again seem to have most problems 
in accessing both short-term and long-term finance. While small firms on average describe 
their prospects to obtain short-term finance as “fairly difficult”, large firms tend to judge it as 
“fairly easy”, with medium-sized firms in between. The results by country are presented in 
annex 5. 
                                                 
27 The exact question in BEEPS 2002 was: “How problematic are these different factors for the 
operation and growth of your business?” 
28 Firms with less than two or more than 10,000 employees were excluded from the BEEPS. 
29 The results by country (annex 5) show that in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania 
urban firms on average experience less difficulty in accessing short and long-term capital from 
commercial banks than rural firms. The same is true for short-term finance in Hungary and Latvia, and 
for long-term finance in Romania and Slovenia. The differences, however, are rather marginal. 
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Table 13: Access to short-term and long-term capital, average score for all ACs 
 Access to short-term 
finance 
Access to long-term 
finance 
For all firms 3.32 3.06 
By geographical location  
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 3.42 3.09 
(2) Other, over 1 million inhabitants 3.75 3.75 
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 3.16 2.91 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.35 3.14 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.34 3.07 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.27 3.05 
By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 3.16 2.91 
Medium (50-249 employees) 3.54 3.24 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 3.78 3.49 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
Note: The average score is based on a scale from 1 (impossible), 2 (very difficult), 3 (fairly difficult), 4 
(fairly easy) to 5 (very easy). 
 
The picture becomes more complete when the sources of finance are reviewed. Table 14 
shows that the proportion of external finance as part of the total financing is rather small, and 
that borrowing from banks in general is very low. Only 9.59 per cent of working capital is 
financed by local private commercial banks, state-owned banks and foreign banks, and only 
9.98 per cent of long-term financing comes from these banks. This reflects the low level of 
financial deepening in the ACs, which is also apparent in their low bank lending to GDP 
ratios discussed before (cf. section two). 
 
Table 14: Sources of finance for working capital and new investment, average for all 
ACs (in per cent) 
Source of finance Working capital New investments 
Internal funds/retained earnings 64.79 48.83 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 5.12 3.41 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 5.48 5.40 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 3.14 3.35 
Borrowing from foreign banks 0.97 1.24 
Loans from family/friends 3.15 2.33 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.90 0.65 
Trade credit from suppliers 5.63 1.33 
Trade credit from customers 1.45 0.36 
Credit cards 0.52 0.37 
Leasing arrangement 2.20 5.69 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 1.81 1.70 
Other 2.33 2.11 
Sum 97.49 76.77 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
 
Tables 14 and 15 show that roughly half or more of the financing of working capital and of 
new investments of the interviewed firms is generated by internal funds. In their financing of 
working capital small firms rely to almost 70 per cent on internal funds, much more than large 
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and medium-sized firms. Financing through equity generally plays a minor role, which 
reflects the low market capitalisation in the ACs. Equity financing only plays a considerable 
role in Hungary and Latvia, and interestingly also for small firms in the Czech and Slovak 
Republic (see annex 6 for the results by country). Trade credit from suppliers is a relatively 
important source of finance for large and medium-sized firms in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland, and for small firms in Latvia. Government finance appears to be of importance 
for larger firms in Bulgaria and medium-sized firms in the Czech and Slovak Republic. 
 
Table 15: Sources of finance for all ACs, by size of firm (in per cent) 
Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained 
earnings 56.25 48.08 59.73 49.47 67.99 48.82 
Equity (i.e. issue of new 
shares) 3.75 1.82 5.09 3.31 5.40 3.77 
Borrowing from local 
private commercial 
banks 
9.66 9.89 8.73 8.42 3.71 3.65 
Borrowing from state-
owned banks, including 
state development 
banks 
4.87 4.16 3.22 2.64 2.75 3.37 
Borrowing from foreign 
banks 2.55 3.48 1.45 1.89 0.50 0.59 
Loans from 
family/friends 0.65 0.47 0.58 0.78 4.35 3.14 
Money lenders or other 
informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 
0.26 0.32 0.77 0.47 1.07 0.77 
Trade credit from 
suppliers 7.20 1.82 6.75 1.40 5.01 1.20 
Trade credit from 
customers 1.77 1.03 1.40 0.28 1.42 0.24 
Credit cards 0.36 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.67 0.51 
Leasing arrangement 2.05 5.84 1.89 4.85 2.31 5.88 
Government (other than 
state-owned banks) 2.17 2.20 3.78 3.88 1.19 1.00 
Other 2.01 3.17 4.27 3.27 1.86 1.57 
Sum 93.55 79.23 93.48 77.40 96.38 72.96 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
 
The data show that bank credit generally plays a relatively small role in the overall financing 
of both working capital and new investment. Borrowing from banks, however, plays a far 
more important role for large firms, who on average finance around 17 per cent of their 
working capital and new investment through bank credit. This is compared with around 13 
per cent for medium firms and 7 per cent for small firms (cf. table 16). The breakdown per 
country also reveals a very clear relationship between bank credit and firm size. There are 
outliers for medium-sized firms in Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia, 
but the pattern as such is very clear. That is, large firms do rely on bank finance to a much 
greater extent than small and medium enterprises. Romania appears to be the only country 
where the differences between small, medium and large firms in bank financing are relatively 
low. Bank lending in virtually all other ACs shows strong distinctions with respect to firm 
size. 
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And while bank lending in general appears to be a limited source of finance, especially for 
small firms, borrowing from foreign banks seems to be almost negligible. In general, BEEPS 
indicates that borrowing from local private banks seems to be more important than borrowing 
from state-owned banks (including state development banks), which again play a more 
significant role than foreign banks. This result is somewhat puzzling, given the fact that 
foreign-owned banks hold on average about 70 per cent of all assets in the ACs. 
 
Table 16: Borrowing from banks (local private commercial, state-owned and foreign 
banks, in per cent) 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
AC-10 17.09 17.54 13.40 12.95 6.96 7.61 
Bulgaria 16.74 18.94 12.16 10.01 8.76 5.75 
Czech 
Republic 21.97 22.23 12.40 12.07 6.75 9.39 
Estonia 9.78 10.09 9.58 11.50 5.04 4.31 
Hungary 19.12 28.69 24.74 15.53 6.14 10.11 
Latvia 10.84 20.60 8.84 15.00 3.47 2.74 
Lithuania 14.69 15.47 12.03 6.00 4.02 3.02 
Poland 21.33 14.83 14.92 16.56 8.78 10.09 
Romania 12.90 10.00 12.22 7.94 10.74 9.41 
Slovak 
Republic 16.45 13.16 8.69 15.40 3.07 3.47 
Slovenia 17.84 16.84 13.80 19.20 8.15 11.47 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
 
A possible explanation would be that foreign banks tend to finance a rather small number of 
large projects, so that while the foreign banks’ share of overall banking assets is highly 
important, financing through foreign banks is of minor importance for many firms. This 
explanation would support the hypothesis that foreign-owned banks are not engaged in much 
financing of small businesses. This explanation, however, would need further qualification 
and cannot be taken as a definite conclusion of the BEEPS. 
A more likely explanation is that a great number of the firms questioned for the BEEPS 
simply may not be aware of the fact that their house bank is foreign-owned. For instance, the 
results in annex 6 would suggest that in Estonia virtually no medium or small firm gets 
financing from foreign banks, although foreign banks hold nearly 100 per cent of all banking 
assets in the country. This seems highly implausible. It is rather likely that customers of 
Hansapank and Eesti Ühispank still regard them as local banks, although they are actually 
Swedish-owned. 
Nevertheless, the findings are very straightforward when leaving aside the distinction between 
types of banks. Small firms receive less financing from banks than medium-sized firms, 
which again receive less than larger firms. 
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3.2  EFFECTS OF BANKING COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION ON SME 
 FINANCE 
In the previous sections we have seen that while financing conditions have improved over the 
past years, the level of financial deepening is nevertheless very low. Access to finance still 
constitutes a problem in most ACs. This is particularly true for SMEs. 
It is widely acknowledged that the underdevelopment of domestic financial markets mainly 
constrains the growth of relatively small and medium businesses. Larger firms find it easier to 
overcome local financial market imperfections by raising funds abroad, where they are more 
abundant and available. In a study for the European Commission, Gianetti et al. (2002, p. 3) 
point out that “if financial market integration among European countries helps develop local 
financial markets or widens the geographical limits within which SMEs can raise funds, it 
will prompt a disproportionate growth of SMEs.” The question, however, is whether this will 
be the case. As discussed in section one, financial integration should theoretically increase the 
overall supply of finance. This section will discuss whether this improvement will also reach 
SMEs or if the benefits of financial integration will mostly advance financing conditions for 
large enterprises, leaving SMEs aside. 
While financial integration – especially through the presence of foreign banks – is likely to 
spur the efficiency of the financial intermediaries and markets of financially less developed 
countries, this section argues that the restructuring of the ACs’ financial sectors might mostly 
benefit larger companies while SMEs will be left on their own. The reasoning is as follows: as 
pointed out by Chick (2000), financial markets are not like other businesses and competition 
cannot be expected to produce results similar to those in ordinary business. In particular, 
competition is likely to entail concentration in the banking sector. The central importance of 
banking is its relationship with other businesses. If banking becomes more concentrated and 
dominated by foreign banks – a process that can already be observed in the ACs – large 
companies will be favoured recipients of loans and other financial services whereas small and 
medium companies, especially in peripheral regions, will find it more difficult to get finance. 
In a perfect market situation, where all information is readily available to all parties, there 
would be no such financing gap. But reality is characterised by market imperfections which 
are due to information asymmetry. Because the lender cannot easily assess the riskiness of the 
borrower’s project, it is a costly exercise to obtain information regarding the quality of the 
business and its management. In their seminal contribution Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed 
that this lack of information may lead credit institutions to adverse selection and thus credit 
rationing. In order not to crowd out the borrowers with good risk who are only willing to pay 
lower interest rates, the rates are set below the market clearing level with a resulting shortage 
of available funds. 
If financial markets are undergoing major structural adjustments due to increased competition, 
this is likely to have an impact on the relationship between banks and borrowers. Relationship 
lending is of particular importance to SMEs. Under relationship lending, according to Berger, 
Klapper and Udell (2001, pp. 2,129-2,130), “information is gathered by the lender beyond the 
relatively transparent data available in the financial statements and other sources readily 
available at the time of origination. The information is gathered through contact over time 
with the firm, its owner, and its local community on a variety of dimensions. The lender may 
gather data from the provision of past loans and other services to the business. Information 
may also be garnered from contact with the borrower’s customers and suppliers, and from the 
lender’s knowledge of the borrower’s interaction with the local community. This information 
is used in making additional decisions over time regarding renewals, additional loans, 
renegotiations, and monitoring strategies, and is not shared with other potential lenders. The 
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production of relationship information is costly, and the costs are likely to be passed on to the 
relationship borrowers.” 
The counterpart to relationship lending is pure transactions lending, under which due 
diligence and contract terms are based on information that is relatively easily on hand. Each 
transaction stands on its own, and information from the relationship between the lender and 
the borrower, if any, is irrelevant (Berger, Klapper and Udell, 2001, p. 2,130). 
The so-called large-bank barriers hypothesis claims that large banks tend to have difficulty 
extending relationship loans to informationally opaque small businesses (Berger, Klapper and 
Udell, 2001, p. 2,131). Large banks, which typically provide transaction lending and other 
wholesale capital market services to large corporate customers, tend to have organisational 
structures that are designed for efficient transaction-based lending. This lending is based on 
“hard” information such as quantitative financial ratios, collateral and credit scores. They 
often offer standardised credit policies based on easily observable, verifiable, and 
transmittable data. In contrast, relationship information often involves “soft” data, e.g. 
information about the character and reliability of the firm’s owner, and may be more difficult 
to quantify, verify and communicate through the layers of management and ownership of 
large banking organisations (Berger and Udell, 2002). Furthermore, large banks may find it 
more difficult to engage in relationship lending than locally-owned institutions, as 
relationship lending may require local knowledge which large banks that are headquartered 
away will find more difficult to build up (Berger, Klapper and Udell, 2001, p. 2,131). 
A large body of empirical work seems to support the large-bank barriers hypothesis. For 
example, Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) find that large banks in the US tend to devote a 
lower proportion of their assets to small business lending than smaller institutions. Haynes et 
al. (1999) find that large banks lend to larger, older and more financially secure businesses 
relatively more often than do small banks. That is, they seem to focus on firms that are most 
likely to receive transactions loans. Another study by Goldberg et al. (2002) finds that large 
banks have a tendency to base their small business loan approval decisions more on financial 
ratios, while the existence of a previous relationship with the borrowing firm mattered more 
to small banks.30 
How does this relate to the ACs? While there is no data available to statistically confirm or 
refute the large-bank barriers hypothesis for the ACs’ banking sectors, the increasing 
dominance of large banks in the region can be assessed. Increased competition is likely to 
reduce the local monopoly power of small local banks but increase the market power of the 
large money centre banks (Chick and Dow, 1994). While the banking system as a whole will 
as a result be more unconstrained in its power to create credit, the large-bank barriers 
hypothesis supposes that some constraints on credit availability to small enterprises will be 
preserved, and additional constraints introduced. 
As can be seen from table 17, concentration in the banking sector is relatively high in all ACs. 
With the exception of Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, the market shares of the five largest 
banks in the ACs is markedly higher than the unweighted average of 55 per cent for the EU-
15 countries. 
 
                                                 
30 For further references see Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001, pp. 2,131-3). 
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Table 17: Total assets of five largest banks relative to total assets of all banks (in per 
cent) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria na na na na na 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.55 
Czech 
Republic 0.81 0.74 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.66 
Estonia 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.78 0.87 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Hungary 0.72 0.66 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.57 0.55 
Latvia na 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.66 0.65 
Lithuania na na 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.84 
Poland 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.56 
Romania na na na na 0.76 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.68 
Slovak 
Republic 0.87 0.82 0.75 0.68 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.63 0.67 0.67 
Slovenia na 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.69 
Source: EBRD country database. 
 
Another indicator for increased competition and consolidation in the ACs’ banking sectors is 
the number of banking institutions as shown in table 18. The number of banks decreased 
markedly over the past years. Between 1995 and 2002, the number of banks decreased by 63 
per cent in Estonia, 45 per cent in Latvia, 43 per cent in Slovenia, 39 per cent in the Slovak 
Republic, 32 per cent in the Czech Republic and 27 per cent in Poland. The only country to 
register a rise in the number of banks between 1995 and 2002 is Romania.31 
 
Table 18: Number of banks (of which foreign owned) 1995-2002 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bulgaria 41 (3) 42 (3) 28 (7) 34 (17) 34 (22) 35 (25) 35 (26) 34 (26) 
Czech 
Republic 55 (23) 53 (23) 50 (24) 45 (25) 42 (27) 40 (26) 38 (26) 37(26) 
Estonia 19 (5) 15 (4) 12 (4) 6 (3) 7 (3) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7(4) 
Hungary 43 (21) 42 (24) 45 (30) 44 (28) 43 (29) 42 (33) 41 (31) 38(27) 
Latvia 42 (11) 35 (14) 32 (15) 27 (15) 23(12) 21(12) 23 (10) 23(9) 
Lithuania 15 (0) 12 (3) 12 (4) 12 (5) 13 (4) 13(6) 13 (6) 14(7) 
Poland 81 (18) 81 (25) 83 (29) 83 (31) 77 (39) 74 (47) 64 (46) 59(45) 
Romania 24 (8) 31 (10) 33 (13) 36 (16) 34 (19) 33 (21) 33 (24) 31 (24) 
Slovak 
Republic 33 (18) 29 (14) 29 (13) 27 (11) 25 (11) 23 (14) 21 (13) 20(15) 
Slovenia 39 (6) 36 (4) 34 (4) 30 (3) 31 (5) 28 (6) 24(5) 22(6) 
AC-10 392 (113) 
376 
(124) 
358 
(143) 
344 
(154) 
329 
(171) 
316 
(194) 
299 
(191) 
285 
(189) 
Source: EBRD country database. 
Table 19 shows that the consolidation process in banking and finance has been going on quite 
briskly over the past years, but it seems to have slowed down recently. The effects of merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activities in banking on small business lending have also been 
scrutinised in a number of studies. These usually found that M&As involving large banking 
organisations reduced small business lending substantially.32 
                                                 
31 In 1998-99, there was a restructuring programme in Romania, in the course of which the largest 
Romanian bank, Bancorex, was closed down and bad assets were transferred to a Bank Resolution 
Agency. Since 1998, the number of banks in Romania actually decreased. 
32 The following statement by Pavel Racocha (2003, p. 2), a member of the board of the Czech 
National Bank, displays that this view has been common also among the ACs’ authorities: “In the 
 28
Table 19: Completed M&A in banking, insurance and financial services 
 ≤1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bulgaria 3 5 5 12 7 
Czech Republic  17 17 10 12 12 
Estonia 19 12 2 6 1 
Hungary 20 16 17 11 9 
Latvia 12 7 5 5 1 
Lithuania 8 7 6 4 5 
Poland 42 30 27 26 14 
Romania 8 4 6 4 5 
Slovak Republic 2 4 10 8 4 
Slovenia 0 1 4 2 3 
Source: Bureau Van Dijk/ZEPHYR. 
 
The analysis of the BEEPS data in the previous section showed a very clear positive 
relationship between the size of firms and their financing through bank credit. Whereas the 
BEEPS makes no distinction between large and small banks, and thus cannot be employed to 
empirically verify or refute the large-bank barriers hypothesis, the fact that the ACs’ banking 
sectors are highly concentrated and hence dominated by larger banks gives reason to assume 
that large banks in the ACs indeed do not extend their services to small enterprises on the 
same scale as they do to large businesses. 
Another issue is the dominance of foreign banks. The foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis 
states that foreign-owned banks are less likely to lend to informationally opaque small 
businesses than domestically-owned banks (cf. Berger, Klapper and Udell, 2001, pp. 2,133-5). 
The argument is similar to the large-bank barriers hypothesis: because banks entering a 
foreign market are likely to be large and headquartered far away from small local businesses, 
they will find it difficult to extend relationship lending to these borrowers. In addition, 
cultural and language barriers, as well as non-familiarity with the local markets, may make it 
more difficult and hence costly to gather and process locally-based relationship information.33 
Empirical evidence also seems to support this hypothesis. Clarke et al. (2001, p. 20), for 
example, note that “In general, foreign banks appear to allocate greater shares of their lending 
portfolios to commercial and industrial loans, providing indirect evidence that foreign banks 
may be more important in the market for loans to large companies.” 
In section 2.5 we discussed the dominance of foreign banks, with foreign investors currently 
owning more than two-thirds of the banking system of the ACs as a whole. In 2002, 189 out 
of the 285 commercial banks in the region were controlled by foreign owners, with a strong 
tendency towards larger institutions (cf. table 18). The presence of foreign banks is likely to 
increase in the course of the next years, particularly as a result of the EU’s single passport 
                                                                                                                                                        
Czech Republic, the privatization of banks had been delayed for several years due to the government’s 
belief that privatized banks would stop providing soft loans to strategically important firms. This fear 
was underlined by the experience with foreign banks that were entering the market since 1992 and 
cherry-picking their clients.” For references on the effects of M&As in banking on small business 
lending see Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001, p. 2,132). 
33 A qualification needs to be made concerning the way foreign banks enter the market. A major 
reason for market entry through the acquisition of domestic banks is to get hold on the local 
knowledge of the bank’s management and staff and the already existing business relations of these 
banks. One would thus expect foreign banks to carefully maintain this local knowledge, making the 
argument of the foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis a less strong one if they enter the market 
through M&As. 
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policy. This allows a bank that is registered in one EU member state to open branches in other 
member countries on the basis of home licences alone. The single passport policy has also 
been applicable to the new member states since 1 May 2004. 
Again, the BEEPS data cannot be employed to affirm the foreign-owned-bank barriers 
hypothesis. But given that (with the exception of Slovenia) the ACs’ banking sectors are 
highly dominated by foreign-owned institutions, the results of the BEEPS analysis present a 
picture that would rather support this hypothesis. Interestingly, firms in Slovenia, the country 
with the lowest foreign-bank penetration, are amongst those with the least complaints about 
access to finance (cf. annex 4). 
If the large-bank barriers hypothesis and the foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis apply, 
this could imply that the structures of the ACs’ banking systems as they have evolved over the 
past decade will pose a serious constraint to the development of SMEs. Further, SMEs might 
not see an improvement in their financing conditions on the scale that will be the case for 
larger enterprises. 
In addition to increasing competition in banking, the local stock exchanges will increasingly 
face problems competing with the major financial centres of the west, and their future might 
be in question (see Claessens et al., 2003). While larger firms will find much more favourable 
financing conditions as they can raise funds both domestically and overseas, the majority of 
small and medium-sized firms will not be able to go directly overseas. Since these firms are 
important for economic growth and need to raise capital, a decline in local market activity 
could prove to be a costly outcome for the ACs. 
 30
4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper started with a brief discussion of the linkages between financial integration, 
financial development and economic growth. It then went on to look at the degree of financial 
integration between the ACs and the western European financial markets. While most of the 
indicators were able to show an overall trend of increasing convergence and integration, it is 
particularly the foreign bank penetration indicators that display the real dimension of financial 
integration with the “old” EU member states. 
The paper then turned to look at the financing conditions of businesses in the ACs. Despite 
great improvements, the ACs’ banking sectors are still fairly underdeveloped and financing 
conditions persist to severely constrain the development of the private sector. Access to 
finance particularly proves to be a problem for SMEs. The paper argues that the increasing 
dominance of large and foreign banking institutions in almost all ACs might pose problems to 
the development of SMEs. These enterprises play a crucial role in the development of the 
private sector, and hence economic growth. While financial integration and the dominance of 
foreign banks will make the banking systems more unconstrained in their power to create 
credit, this might largely benefit larger businesses, leaving small and medium enterprises 
aside. The large-bank barriers hypothesis and the foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis 
suppose that large and foreign institutions have problems extending loans to smaller entities. 
In the ACs, it is especially these banking institutions that dominate the market, suggesting that 
SMEs might not see an improvement in their financing conditions on the scale that will be the 
case for larger enterprises. 
The analysis of the BEEPS data covering information on 2,427 enterprises in the ACs showed 
a clear pattern regarding firms’ access to finance. In general, small firms appear to have much 
larger problems in getting funding than medium and large enterprises. Furthermore, an 
analysis of the sources of finance for working capital and investment gave evidence of a 
strong positive relationship between the size of firms and their financing through bank credit. 
While these results cannot be taken as sufficient empirical proof of the large-bank barriers 
hypothesis and the foreign-owned-bank barriers hypothesis, they do support these hypotheses. 
Also the national and European authorities have started to become aware of this problem.34 
For example, in a recent report, the European Commission recognises that the need to 
promote entrepreneurship in Europe requires focused public action to close gaps in the 
availability of market finance for small businesses. In particular, “the accession and candidate 
countries need to pay attention to the further development of their financial systems. This 
includes capacity building throughout the financial sector making it easier for banks to 
become more acquainted with SMEs and more willing to provide medium and long-term 
lending. Furthermore, a gradual emergence of an equity culture will open the way for a more 
developed venture capital industry.” (European Commission, 2003a, p. 7) 
However, despite these issues, one should not paint a too gloomy picture in regard to foreign 
bank penetration. The entrance of foreign banks has significantly increased the standards and 
the efficiency of the ACs’ banking systems. Bokros (2001, p. 17), for example, states that 
“Foreign strategic investment in most lending banks has proved to be an unqualified success 
in both Poland and Hungary, after several consecutive efforts of government-orchestrated and 
government-financed consolidation of insolvent state-owned banks. Foreign strategic partners 
have been able and willing to provide not only much-needed additional capital and 
                                                 
34 For an overview on European and national schemes to support SMEs’ access to finance in old and 
new member states see European Commission (2003a) and (2003b). For a discussion of how the 
financing gap for small businesses might be addressed see Tucker and Lean (2003). 
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management skills but also product development and innovation, modernization of risk 
management and treasury operations, internal audit and control, and information technology.” 
Similarly, Guarco et al. (2003, p. 77) state that “By and large western ownership and control 
have proven highly beneficial to banks in CEE [central and eastern Europe]. They brought 
expertise, in the form of product knowledge, risk management, or technology. They brought 
advantages for funding and capitalization, as well as a welcome shield against government 
interference.” 
Furthermore, if improved efficiency in the banking system results in an expansion in total 
lending, the amount of lending to SMEs might increase even if the share of lending to them 
falls. Also, increased pressure from the presence of foreign banks might cause smaller and 
domestic banks to modify their behaviour and make them seek new market niches (Clarke et 
al., 2002, p. 21). A focus of large and foreign banking institutions on providing financial 
services to larger corporations could offer opportunities for small local banks to extend their 
services particularly to SMEs. Nevertheless, to ensure a favourable business environment also 
for small businesses, both national and European financial services authorities need to keep an 
eye on these developments, and be ready to step in if appropriate. 
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Annex 1.1: Foreign claims of reporting banks on individual countries (in millions of US dollars) 
by nationality of reporting banks, end-September 2003 
Claims vis-à-vis Total foreign 
claims
Claims of EU-
13*
Claims of EU-13 as per cent 
of total foreign claims
All countries 14,658,959 8,672,237 59.16
EU-15 7,022,609 4,486,053 63.88
AC-10 227,864 195,430 85.77
Bulgaria 3,244 2,654 81.81
Czech Republic 49,979 45,574 91.19
Estonia 7,877 7,706 97.83
Hungary 45,746 39,125 85.53
Latvia 3,873 3,718 96.00
Lithuania 5,687 5,398 94.92
Poland 80,909 64,518 79.74
Romania 6,748 5,257 77.9
Slovak Republic 15,356 14,121 91.96
Slovenia 8,445 7,359 87.14  
Claims vis-à-
vis
Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United 
Kingdom
United 
States
All countries 94,380 572,571 356,531 73,821 49,007 1,281,317 2,476,050 350,258 320,841 1,187,650 1,174,549 59,467 375,116 203,645 1,481,685 1,641,215 784,624
EU-15 51,207 403,910 84,822 56,658 28,030 631,884 1,430,570 283,715 176,525 414,872 632,172 42,673 173,776 133,512 575,222 441,421 363,516
AC-10 14,415 37,058 443 0 2,435 13,418 66,313 0 29,478 1,811 16,119 121 822 13,589 1,572 1,662 12,898
Bulgaria 99 24 298 1,147 847 61 215 9 2 114 13 221
Czech Republic 4,239 19,504 6,271 10,572 1,881 181 2,780 46 270 11 113 2,030
Estonia 56 30 1,132 5 618 59 35 33 1 5,769 6 3 13
Hungary 3,129 6,814 238 10 1,723 19,413 5,129 407 2,039 14 199 35 488 620 2,306
Latvia 29 14 628 6 862 11 12 10 1 2,155 6 2 17
Lithuania 104 18 445 30 1,424 11 26 12 9 1 3,337 37 7 94
Poland 3,874 7,798 205 217 1,949 25,008 14,235 856 8,186 48 275 2,112 561 816 6,667
Romania 390 69 3 940 1,535 536 15 1,592 16 71 75 105 805
Slovak Republic 1,209 2,198 458 2,555 6,363 128 1,144 14 94 153 86 732
Slovenia 1,286 589 1,738 3,179 406 90 108 4 36 3 19 10 13  
Sources: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, third quarter 2003, January 2004, Table 9 and EBRD country database. 
* EU-13 comprises the EU-15 countries minus Greece and Luxemburg, whose banks are not listed in the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. 
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Annex 1.2: Foreign claims on individual recipient countries as per cent of total foreign claims 
Claims vis-à-
vis
Total 
foreign 
claims
EU-13* Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United 
Kingdom
United 
States
All countries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EU-15 47.9 51.7 54.3 70.5 23.8 76.8 57.2 49.3 57.8 81.0 55.0 34.9 53.8 71.8 46.3 65.6 38.8 26.9 46.3
AC-10 1.6 2.3 15.3 6.5 0.1 0.0 5.0 1.0 2.7 0.0 9.2 0.2 1.4 0.2 0.2 6.7 0.1 0.1 1.6
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 0.3 0.5 4.5 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Estonia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 0.3 0.5 3.3 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Poland 0.6 0.7 4.1 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.0 4.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
Romania 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Slovak Republic 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Slovenia 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, third Quarter 2003, January 2004, Table 9 and author’s calculations. 
Annex 1.3: Foreign claims of BIS reporting banks on ACs as per cent of domestic credit 
Claims vis-à-
vis
Total 
foreign 
claims
EU-13* Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United 
Kingdom
United 
States
EU-15 56.1 35.8 0.4 3.2 0.7 0.5 0.2 5.0 11.4 2.3 1.4 3.3 5.0 0.3 1.4 1.1 4.6 3.5 2.9
AC-10 98.7 84.7 6.2 16.1 0.2 0.0 1.1 5.8 28.7 0.0 12.8 0.8 7.0 0.1 0.4 5.9 0.7 0.7 5.6
Bulgaria 51.7 42.3 1.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 18.3 0.0 13.5 1.0 3.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.2 3.5
Czech Republic 121.8 111.0 10.3 47.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.3 25.8 0.0 4.6 0.4 6.8 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 4.9
Estonia 141.8 138.7 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 20.4 0.1 11.1 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 103.9 0.1 0.1 0.2
Hungary 87.6 75.0 6.0 13.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 3.3 37.2 0.0 9.8 0.8 3.9 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.9 1.2 4.4
Latvia 75.0 72.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 12.2 0.1 16.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 41.7 0.1 0.0 0.3
Lithuania 121.4 115.2 2.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.6 30.4 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 71.2 0.8 0.1 2.0
Poland 116.6 92.9 5.6 11.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 2.8 36.0 0.0 20.5 1.2 11.8 0.1 0.4 3.0 0.8 1.2 9.6
Romania 76.1 59.3 4.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 17.3 0.0 6.0 0.2 17.9 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 9.1
Slovak Republic 73.3 67.4 5.8 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 12.2 0.0 30.4 0.6 5.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.4 3.5
Slovenia 50.7 44.2 7.7 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.4 19.1 0.0 2.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1  
Sources: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, third quarter 2003, January 2004, Table 9, EBRD country database and Eurostat. 
* EU-13 comprises the EU-15 countries minus Greece and Luxemburg, whose banks are not listed in the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics.
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Annex 1.4: Foreign claims of BIS reporting banks on ACs as per cent of GDP 
Claims vis-à-
vis
Total 
foreign 
claims
EU-13* Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United 
Kingdom
United 
States
EU-15 66.9 42.8 0.5 3.8 0.8 0.5 0.3 6.0 13.6 2.7 1.7 4.0 6.0 0.4 1.7 1.3 5.5 4.2 3.5
AC-10 41.9 35.9 2.6 6.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 2.5 12.2 0.0 5.4 0.3 3.0 0.0 0.2 2.5 0.3 0.3 2.4
Bulgaria 16.3 13.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 5.8 0.0 4.2 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 1.1
Czech Republic 58.5 53.3 5.0 22.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 12.4 0.0 2.2 0.2 3.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.4
Estonia 94.0 91.9 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 13.5 0.1 7.4 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 68.8 0.1 0.0 0.2
Hungary 56.9 48.7 3.9 8.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.1 24.2 0.0 6.4 0.5 2.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.8 2.9
Latvia 37.7 36.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 6.1 0.1 8.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 21.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
Lithuania 31.0 29.4 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.2 7.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.2 0.0 0.5
Poland 39.1 31.2 1.9 3.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9 12.1 0.0 6.9 0.4 4.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.4 3.2
Romania 12.3 9.6 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.5
Slovak Republic 47.2 43.4 3.7 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 7.9 0.0 19.6 0.4 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 2.3
Slovenia 30.8 26.9 4.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 11.6 0.0 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  
Sources: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, third quarter 2003, January 2004, Table 9 and EBRD country database. 
* EU-13 comprises the EU-15 countries minus Greece and Luxemburg, whose banks are not listed in the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. 
 
 38
Annex 2: The 20 largest banks in the ACs 
Rank Bank Country Total assets in 
200235 
Main shareholder(s) 
1 Powszechna Kasa 
Oszczednosci Bank 
Polski SA – PKO BP 
SA 
Poland PLN 82,018 million 
(US$ 20,102.5 
million) 
1. State of Poland (Poland) 100% 
2 Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka – 
CSOB 
Czech 
Republic 
CZK 597,044.0 
million  
(US$ 18,236.5 
million) 
1. KBC Bank and Insurance Holding 85.42% (Belgium) 
2. EBRD 7.47% (IFI) 
3. IFC 4.38 (IFI) 
3 Ceska Sporitelna a.s. Czech 
Republic 
CZK 519,691 
million  
(US$ 15,873.8 
million) 
1. Erste Bank der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG - 
IAS 94.80% (Austria) 
4 Bank Pekao SA-Bank 
Polska Kasa Opieki SA 
Poland PLN 65,084 million 
(US$ 15,951.96 
million) 
1. Unicredito Italiano SPA (Italy) 53.05% 
2. State Treasury (Poland) 4.13% 
3. EBRD (IFI) 3.31% 
4. Allianz AG (Germany) 2.13% 
5 Komercni Banka Czech 
Republic 
CZK 439,753 
million  
(US$ 15,081.5 
million) 
1. Societe Generale (France) 60.35% 
2. The Bank of New York (US) 5.46% 
6 Orszagos 
Takarekpenztar es 
Kereskedelmi - OTP 
Bank 
Hungary HUF 2,719 billion  
(US$ 10,543.4 
million) 
1. Foreign institutional investors 80.80% 
2. Domestic institutional investors (Hungary) 11.30% 
3. Treasury (Hungary) 4.90% 
4. Management and Employees (Hungary) 2.80% 
5. State Budgetary Organisation (Hungary) 0.10% 
7 Bank Przemyslowo-
Handlowy PBK SA 
Poland PLN 45,095 million 
(US$ 11,052.7) 
1. HVB/ Bank Austria Creditanstalt (Germany/Austria) 
71.08% 
2. Bank of New York (US) 4.04% 
3. State Treasury (Poland) 3.68% 
8 Nova Ljubljanska 
Banka d.d. 
Slovenia SIT 1,980,481 
million  
(US$ 8,243.4 
million) 
1. State of Slovenia 35.71% 
2. KBC Bank NV (Belgium) 34.00% 
3. Slovenska Odskodninska Druzba d.d. (Slovenia) 
5.05% 
4. Kapitalska Druzba d.d. – PPS (Slovenia) 5.01% 
5. EBRD (IFI) 5.00% 
9 Bank Handlowy w 
Warszawie S.A. 
Poland PLN 32,182 million 
(US$ 7,887.8) 
1. Citibank (US) 93.20% 
10 Ceska konsolidacni 
agentura – CAS 
Czech 
Republic 
CZK 249,871 
million  
(US$ 7,632.2 
million) 
na 
11 BRE Bank SA Poland PLN 27,432 million 
(US$ 6,723.5 
million) 
1. Commerzbank AG (Germany) 50.10% 
2. Commercial Union OFE BPH CU WBK (Poland) 
>5.00% 
3. Intesabci Holding International SA (Luxemburg) 
4.97% 
12 ING Bank Slaski S.A. - 
Capital Group 
Poland PLN 26,978 million 
(US$ 6,612.3 
million) 
1. ING Groep NV (Netherlands) 87.80% 
2. Templeton Asset Management (US) 7.20% 
3. PTE Commercial Union (Poland) 1.60% 
13 Bank Zachodni WBK 
S.A. 
Poland PLN 24,913 million 
(US$ 6,106.1 
million) 
1. AIB European Investments Limited (Ireland) 70.50% 
                                                 
35 For converting the local currency amounts into US$ the average exchange rates for 2002 were used. 
A ranking according to the resulting US$ amounts would be slightly different from the BanksScope 
ranking. 
 39
Annex 2 (continued): The 20 largest banks in the ACs 
14 Kredyt Bank Poland PLN 24,061 million 
(US$ 5,897.3 
million) 
1. KBC Bank NV (Belgium) 81.40% 
15 HansaPank Estonia EEK 81,984 million 
(US$4,935.2 
million) 
1. Foereningssparbanken - Swedbank (Sweden) 
59.70% 
2. Nordea Bank Finland (Finland) 5.80% 
3. EBRD (IFI) 4.80% 
4. Chase (GB) 3.30% 
5. J.P. Morgan Bank Luxembourg SA (Luxembourg) 
2.40% 
6. AS Suprema (n.a.) 1.60% 
7. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Sweden) 1.50% 
8. Pictet & Cie (Switzerland) 1.20% 
9. Bank Austria Creditanstalt (Austria) 1.10% 
10. Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG (Austria) 
1.00% 
16 K&H Bank-
Kereskedelmi es 
Hitelbank RT 
Hungary HUF 1,235 billion  
(US$ 4,788.9 
million) 
1. KBC Bank NV (Belgium) 59.01% 
2. ABN Amro (Netherlands) 40.22% 
17 Slovenska sporitel'na 
as 
Slovak 
Republic 
SKK 205,037 
million  
(US$ 4,523.5 
million) 
1. Erste Bank der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG 
(Austria) 70.01% 
2. EBRD (IFI) 19.98% 
3. Ministry of Finance (Slovak Republic) 10.00% 
18 Bank Millennium Poland PLN 18,726 million 
(US$ 4,589.7 
million) 
1. Banco Comercial Portugues, SA (Portugal) 50.00% 
2. EUREKO B.V. (Netherlands) 19.98% 
19 Vseobecna Uverova 
Banka a.s. 
Slovak 
Republic 
SKK 194,716 
million  
(US$ 4,295.8 
million) 
1. Banca Intesa SPA (Italy) 94.47% 
20 Bank Gospodarki 
Zywnosciowej 
Poland PLN 17,937 million 
(US$ 4,396.3 
million) 
1. State Treasury (Poland) 69.45% 
2. Bank Polskiej Spoldzielczosci SA (Poland) 16.59% 
3. Gospodarczy Bank Wielkopolski S.A. (Poland) 7.85% 
4. Mazowiecki Bank Regionalny SA (Poland) 3.78% 
5. Banki Spolkdzielcze (Poland) 1.93% 
6. B.G.Z. SA (Poland) 0.40% 
Source: BankScope (Bureau van Dijk), January 2004. 
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Annex 3: Characteristics of the BEEPS dataset for ACs 
BULGARIA  CZECH REPUBLIC  
Total no. of observations 250 Total no. of observations 268 
Of which:  Of which:  
Urban (50,000 and above) 156 Urban (50,000 and above) 151 
Rural (under 50,000) 94 Rural (under 50,000) 117 
Small (2-49 employees) 174 Small (2-49 employees) 179 
Medium (50-249 employees) 38 Medium (50-249 employees) 46 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 38 Large (250-9,999 employees) 43 
ESTONIA  HUNGARY  
Total no. of observations 170 Total no. of observations 250 
Of which:  Of which:  
Urban (50,000 and above) 128 Urban (50,000 and above) 196 
Rural (under 50,000) 42 Rural (under 50,000) 54 
Small (2-49 employees) 122 Small (2-49 employees) 170 
Medium (50-249 employees) 26 Medium (50-249 employees) 38 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 22 Large (250-9,999 employees) 42 
LATVIA  LITHUANIA  
Total no. of observations 176 Total no. of observations 200 
Of which:  Of which:  
Urban (50,000 and above) 121 Urban (50,000 and above) 133 
Rural (under 50,000) 55 Rural (under 50,000) 67 
Small (2-49 employees) 125 Small (2-49 employees) 134 
Medium (50-249 employees) 26 Medium (50-249 employees) 40 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 25 Large (250-9,999 employees) 26 
POLAND  ROMANIA  
Total no. of observations 500 Total no. of observations 255 
Of which:  Of which:  
Urban (50,000 and above) 378 Urban (50,000 and above) 174 
Rural (under 50,000) 122 Rural (under 50,000) 81 
Small (2-49 employees) 331 Small (2-49 employees) 154 
Medium (50-249 employees) 108 Medium (50-249 employees) 63 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 61 Large (250-9,999 employees) 38 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  SLOVENIA  
Total no. of observations 170 Total no. of observations 188 
Of which:  Of which:  
Urban (50,000 and above) 139 Urban (50,000 and above) 89 
Rural (under 50,000) 31 Rural (under 50,000) 99 
Small (2-49 employees) 108 Small (2-49 employees) 144 
Medium (50-249 employees) 35 Medium (50-249 employees) 25 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 27 Large (250-9,999 employees) 19 
 
 41
Annex 4: Access to and cost of bank financing by country 
Average score by country on a scale of 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate 
obstacle), 4 (major obstacle). 
 
BULGARIA CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
Finance  
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance 
For all firms 2.80 2.88 For all firms 2.45 2.53 
By geographical location  
(city or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 2.54 2.59 (1) Capital 2.13 2.15 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.86 3.07 (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.61 2.53 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.74 2.94 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.32 2.50 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.70 2.84 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.31 2.36 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.96 2.95 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.63 2.76 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 3.00 3.02 Small (2-49 employees) 2.55 2.73 
Medium (50-249 employees) 2.18 2.59 Medium (50-249 employees) 2.43 2.27 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 2.49 2.55 Large (250-9,999 employees) 2.07 2.02 
 
ESTONIA HUNGARY 
 
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance  
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance 
For all firms 1.94 2.01 For all firms 2.22 2.31 
By geographical location  
(city or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 1.95 1.96 (1) Capital 2.37 2.42 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.38 2.33 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 1.82 2.00 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.12 2.33 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 1.92 1.97 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.25 2.37 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.03 2.15 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.11 2.07 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 1.99 2.07 Small (2-49 employees) 2.34 2.40 
Medium (50-249 employees) 1.92 2.04 Medium (50-249 employees) 2.17 2.26 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 1.73 1.68 Large (250-9,999 employees) 1.76 1.95 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
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Annex 4 (continued): Access to and cost of bank financing by country 
Average score by country on a scale of 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate 
obstacle), 4 (major obstacle). 
 
LATVIA 
 
LITHUANIA 
 
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance  
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance 
For all firms 1.85 2.01 For all firms 1.62 1.99 
By geographical location  
(city or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 1.92 1.99 (1) Capital 1.68 2.16 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 1.10 1.65 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 1.61 1.83 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 1.63 1.68 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 1.87 1.97 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 1.51 1.89 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 1.82 2.10 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 1.81 2.18 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 1.89 1.98 Small (2-49 employees) 1.68 1.97 
Medium (50-249 employees) 1.75 1.83 Medium (50-249 employees) 1.65 2.13 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 1.80 2.28 Large (250-9,999 employees) 1.22 1.88 
 
POLAND 
 
ROMANIA 
 
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance  
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance 
For all firms 2.65 3.17 For all firms 2.55 2.80 
By geographical location  
(city or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 2.46 2.97 (1) Capital 2.80 2.75 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants 2.75 3.50 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.75 3.20 (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.53 3.04 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.67 3.09 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.12 2.42 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.68 3.14 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.46 2.72 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.56 3.26 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.74 2.99 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 2.76 3.23 Small (2-49 employees) 2.63 2.90 
Medium (50-249 employees) 2.40 2.96 Medium (50-249 employees) 2.43 2.63 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 2.57 3.17 Large (250-9,999 employees) 2.41 2.70 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
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Annex 4 (continued): Access to and cost of bank financing by country 
Average score by country on a scale of 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate 
obstacle), 4 (major obstacle). 
 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
 
SLOVENIA 
 
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance  
Access 
to 
finance 
Cost of 
finance 
For all firms 2.50 2.58 For all firms 1.82 2.20 
By geographical location  
(city or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 2.62 2.60 (1) Capital 1.75 1.76 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.59 2.68 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 1.95 2.47 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.60 2.64 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 1.84 2.07 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.03 2.32 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 1.79 2.32 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 2.57 2.68 Small (2-49 employees) 1.90 2.20 
Medium (50-249 employees) 2.45 2.47 Medium (50-249 employees) 1.72 2.40 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 2.24 2.35 Large (250-9,999 employees) 1.28 1.95 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
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Annex 5: Access to short-term and long-term capital 
Average score by country on a scale of 1 (impossible), 2 (very difficult), 3 (fairly difficult), 4 
(fairly easy) to 5 (very easy). 
 
BULGARIA CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance  
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance 
For all firms 2.77 2.56 For all firms 3.21 2.97 
By geographical location (city 
or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 3.35 2.94 (1) Capital 3.67 3.16 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.83 2.55 (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 2.82 2.65 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 2.60 2.53 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.24 3.00 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 2.94 2.68 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.33 2.99 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 2.49 2.37 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.05 2.95 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 2.52 2.42 Small (2-49 employees) 2.99 2.77 
Medium (50-249 employees) 3.34 2.89 Medium (50-249 employees) 3.20 2.98 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 3.36 2.91 Large (250-9,999 employees) 4.02 3.71 
 
ESTONIA HUNGARY 
 
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance  
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance 
For all firms 3.88 3.63 For all firms 3.24 2.99 
By geographical location (city 
or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 4.11 3.82 (1) Capital 3.05 2.83 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 3.78 3.56 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.69 3.66 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.38 3.05 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.98 3.77 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.26 2.98 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.63 3.28 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.19 3.02 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 3.70 3.45 Small (2-49 employees) 3.04 2.79 
Medium (50-249 employees) 3.96 3.83 Medium (50-249 employees) 3.34 3.03 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 4.67 4.24 Large (250-9,999 employees) 3.95 3.71 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
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Annex 5 (continued): Access to short-term and long-term capital 
Average score by country on a scale of 1 (impossible), 2 (very difficult), 3 (fairly difficult), 4 
(fairly easy) to 5 (very easy). 
 
LATVIA 
 
LITHUANIA 
 
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance  
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance 
For all firms 3.28 2.99 For all firms 3.35 3.02 
By geographical location (city 
or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 3.22 2.89 (1) Capital 3.56 3.09 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 3.22 2.93 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.80 3.53 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.31 3.11 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.30 2.98 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.41 3.06 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.23 3.02 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.24 2.95 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 3.10 2.86 Small (2-49 employees) 3.20 2.86 
Medium (50-249 employees) 3.33 2.92 Medium (50-249 employees) 3.46 3.11 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 4.00 3.63 Large (250-9,999 employees) 3.88 3.68 
 
POLAND ROMANIA 
 
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance  
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance 
For all firms 3.29 3.06 For all firms 3.41 3.06 
By geographical location (city 
or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 3.33 3.08 (1) Capital 2.98 2.68 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants 3.75 3.75 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 3.18 2.92 (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000 3.44 3.19 
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.49 3.31 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.55 3.22 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.29 3.05 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.37 3.07 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.28 3.07 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.48 3.05 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 3.13 2.92 Small (2-49 employees) 3.27 2.89 
Medium (50-249 employees) 3.64 3.43 Medium (50-249 employees) 3.67 3.33 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 3.44 3.08 Large (250-9,999 employees) 3.50 3.31 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
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Annex 5 (continued): Access to short-term and long-term capital 
Average score by country on a scale of 1 (impossible), 2 (very difficult), 3 (fairly difficult), 4 
(fairly easy) to 5 (very easy). 
 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SLOVENIA 
 
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance  
Short-
term 
finance 
Long-
term 
finance 
For all firms 3.15 2.95 For all firms 3.97 3.70 
By geographical location (city 
or town)   
By geographical location 
(city or town)   
(1) Capital 3.14 2.78 (1) Capital 3.84 3.67 
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(2) Other, over 1 million 
inhabitants   
(3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   (3) Other, 250,000-1,000,000   
(4) Other, 50,000-250,000 3.03 2.91 (4) Other, 50,000-250,000 4.06 3.81 
(1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.08 2.85 (1-4) 50,000 and above (urban) 3.93 3.72 
(5) Under 50,000 (rural) 3.43 3.33 (5) Under 50,000 (rural) 4.00 3.69 
By size of firm   By size of firm   
Small (2-49 employees) 3.08 2.88 Small (2-49 employees) 3.85 3.60 
Medium (50-249 employees) 3.15 2.85 Medium (50-249 employees) 4.29 3.83 
Large (250-9,999 employees) 3.46 3.33 Large (250-9,999 employees) 4.41 4.38 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
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Annex 6: Sources of finance, by country and size of firm (in per cent) 
 
 
BULGARIA 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 53.03 50.53 62.24 46.18 68.55 50.49 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.19 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 9.37 13.68 7.16 7.37 2.87 1.49 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including 
state development banks 3.42 1.84 1.32 1.32 5.29 3.28 
Borrowing from foreign banks 3.95 3.42 3.68 1.32 0.60 0.98 
Loans from family/friends 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.79 4.71 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.00 2.47 1.29 
Trade credit from suppliers 11.45 1.58 6.05 2.50 6.50 0.72 
Trade credit from customers 2.68 2.63 3.29 0.00 0.78 0.00 
Credit cards 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leasing arrangement 3.47 6.32 0.55 4.47 0.95 1.21 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 9.74 9.47 7.29 5.26 1.90 0.75 
Other 0.00 0.00 5.53 5.26 1.15 1.15 
Total 97.37 89.47 97.37 73.68 99.99 67.26 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 47.30 44.70 44.59 46.63 55.03 46.73 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 1.16 1.16 7.11 1.30 8.46 7.12 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 9.65 8.74 6.96 4.46 4.63 5.00 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including 
state development banks 6.51 3.26 4.35 4.35 1.56 3.83 
Borrowing from foreign banks 5.81 10.23 1.09 3.26 0.56 0.56 
Loans from family/friends 2.56 1.40 0.65 0.00 5.37 3.72 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 1.16 0.00 1.30 0.00 2.68 2.77 
Trade credit from suppliers 5.53 2.49 6.09 1.96 6.44 2.65 
Trade credit from customers 0.47 0.00 1.09 1.09 1.26 0.42 
Credit cards 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.74 1.82 
Leasing arrangement 3.51 10.65 4.07 9.02 2.99 8.87 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 0.23 1.86 4.35 7.28 1.90 2.11 
Other 1.60 1.56 9.67 7.61 3.02 3.80 
Total 86.02 86.05 91.32 86.96 96.64 89.40 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset.
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Annex 6 (continued): Sources of finance, by country and size of firm (in per cent) 
 
 
ESTONIA 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 66.59 59.09 73.85 64.81 69.71 36.96 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 0.00 0.00 3.85 3.85 1.48 1.80 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 6.14 6.45 9.58 11.50 3.97 4.31 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 0.00 
Borrowing from foreign banks 3.64 3.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Loans from family/friends 4.55 4.55 0.19 0.38 2.55 0.82 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 1.34 0.00 1.15 0.00 0.57 0.66 
Trade credit from suppliers 3.18 1.36 8.27 0.38 6.01 1.31 
Trade credit from customers 0.23 0.45 0.00 0.00 2.13 0.00 
Credit cards 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.16 0.82 
Leasing arrangement 4.09 14.00 2.92 7.54 3.98 16.72 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 3.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other 2.50 5.91 0.00 0.00 3.45 2.17 
Total 95.44 95.45 100.00 88.46 95.08 65.57 
 
HUNGARY 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 57.52 40.00 48.82 44.47 66.87 51.34 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 7.86 6.43 12.50 15.79 16.23 13.46 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 13.88 19.05 15.39 10.66 3.22 3.88 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 2.86 7.26 7.24 4.87 2.92 5.82 
Borrowing from foreign banks 2.38 2.38 2.11 0.00 0.00 0.41 
Loans from family/friends 0.00 0.00 1.58 3.16 3.07 2.56 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Trade credit from suppliers 5.62 0.12 6.32 0.79 2.35 0.85 
Trade credit from customers 1.55 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.75 
Credit cards 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.12 
Leasing arrangement 0.00 1.31 0.79 3.55 1.58 2.96 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 2.50 2.86 1.32 0.92 0.41 0.62 
Other 1.07 2.14 3.95 2.63 0.71 0.62 
Total 95.24 83.34 100.02 86.84 98.83 83.39 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset.
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Annex 6 (continued): Sources of finance, by country and size of firm (in per cent) 
 
 
LATVIA 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 28.52 23.40 43.96 19.81 44.63 18.98 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 23.92 4.80 16.00 6.92 16.02 6.09 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 7.72 18.60 5.19 12.31 2.72 1.28 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 2.92 2.00 2.42 0.77 0.52 1.40 
Borrowing from foreign banks 0.20 0.00 1.23 1.92 0.23 0.06 
Loans from family/friends 0.40 0.00 0.15 0.38 5.96 2.88 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.00 1.13 0.56 
Trade credit from suppliers 10.44 0.00 10.81 3.65 9.43 1.04 
Trade credit from customers 2.92 1.20 3.23 0.00 4.73 0.18 
Credit cards 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.19 0.36 1.24 
Leasing arrangement 2.28 2.00 0.73 0.58 2.06 2.12 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 0.00 0.00 1.27 4.23 1.08 0.92 
Other 0.48 4.00 9.88 3.08 5.52 2.45 
Total 80.00 56.00 96.50 53.84 94.39 39.20 
 
LITHUANIA 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 59.88 44.15 65.95 50.93 75.98 58.43 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 0.38 0.00 2.45 0.00 1.53 0.00 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 13.15 10.35 12.00 6.00 3.20 2.20 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 1.54 3.08 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.82 
Borrowing from foreign banks 0.00 2.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Loans from family/friends 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 2.13 3.13 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.99 0.62 
Trade credit from suppliers 7.50 5.58 7.75 2.50 5.93 0.45 
Trade credit from customers 6.54 1.92 1.45 0.00 2.48 0.30 
Credit cards 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 
Leasing arrangement 7.12 10.96 2.20 10.58 2.24 4.58 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.68 1.49 
Other 0.04 2.69 5.30 5.00 2.13 2.60 
Total 96.15 80.77 97.51 75.01 99.26 74.62 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset.
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Annex 6 (continued): Sources of finance, by country and size of firm (in per cent) 
 
 
POLAND 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 54.95 53.36 60.52 50.25 70.91 49.58 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 3.77 2.79 1.78 2.22 1.66 1.03 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 12.56 7.95 9.13 10.44 4.07 4.80 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 5.66 3.93 3.74 2.67 3.90 4.35 
Borrowing from foreign banks 3.11 2.95 2.05 3.45 0.81 0.94 
Loans from family/friends 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.09 3.46 3.19 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.00 1.80 1.16 1.39 0.44 0.09 
Trade credit from suppliers 8.08 2.70 9.54 0.78 5.70 1.59 
Trade credit from customers 0.64 0.08 1.56 0.24 0.87 0.26 
Credit cards 1.15 0.66 0.34 0.02 0.80 0.32 
Leasing arrangement 0.25 2.13 1.14 3.17 3.28 5.68 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 1.23 1.48 4.19 5.05 1.31 1.36 
Other 3.69 3.69 1.81 2.64 1.58 1.45 
Total 95.09 83.52 97.19 82.41 98.79 74.64 
 
ROMANIA 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 68.82 57.63 67.17 64.37 70.40 61.36 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.56 0.91 0.78 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 6.32 2.89 10.90 6.19 6.59 6.07 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 6.05 6.58 0.32 0.00 3.31 2.37 
Borrowing from foreign banks 0.53 0.53 1.00 1.75 0.84 0.97 
Loans from family/friends 0.00 0.00 1.90 3.02 7.28 6.30 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.30 1.04 
Trade credit from suppliers 7.16 0.79 4.10 1.90 3.02 0.94 
Trade credit from customers 3.11 2.11 0.63 0.00 1.26 0.10 
Credit cards 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.71 
Leasing arrangement 0.53 3.16 1.59 1.75 2.19 4.16 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 0.00 0.00 3.17 5.24 0.91 0.65 
Other 6.84 7.89 4.13 2.54 0.68 0.26 
Total 100.02 81.58 99.99 87.32 99.35 85.71 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset.
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Annex 6 (continued): Sources of finance, by country and size of firm (in per cent) 
 
 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 59.33 51.74 58.46 49.29 70.78 58.79 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 2.22 0.37 8.86 6.86 13.62 8.77 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 5.56 2.04 4.29 10.29 1.56 2.59 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 9.78 5.93 2.71 4.00 0.37 0.69 
Borrowing from foreign banks 1.11 5.19 1.69 1.11 1.14 0.19 
Loans from family/friends 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 2.54 1.48 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.00 0.00 0.34 1.71 0.83 0.79 
Trade credit from suppliers 5.56 2.96 1.63 0.00 2.69 1.20 
Trade credit from customers 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.42 0.31 
Credit cards 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Leasing arrangement 0.85 9.56 4.66 7.74 1.84 11.56 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 4.07 3.70 13.43 4.57 1.31 0.94 
Other 0.00 3.70 3.80 0.00 0.05 0.65 
Total 88.89 85.19 100.01 85.71 98.15 87.96 
 
SLOVENIA 
 Large firms Medium firms Small firms 
 Working capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Working 
capital 
New 
investment 
Internal funds/retained earnings 74.32 52.58 71.68 39.20 84.74 50.80 
Equity (i.e. issue of new shares) 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.80 0.12 0.21 
Borrowing from local private commercial banks 6.00 7.89 0.80 4.80 2.99 2.67 
Borrowing from state-owned banks, including state 
development banks 9.47 6.58 13.00 11.60 4.67 7.83 
Borrowing from foreign banks 2.37 2.37 0.00 2.80 0.49 0.97 
Loans from family/friends 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70 1.22 
Money lenders or other informal sources (other 
than family/friends) 0.00 0.00 2.36 0.00 0.28 0.28 
Trade credit from suppliers 5.47 0.00 4.04 0.00 1.32 0.52 
Trade credit from customers 0.00 0.00 4.00 2.00 0.35 0.00 
Credit cards 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.21 
Leasing arrangement 1.32 4.26 1.32 3.20 1.08 0.46 
Government (other than state-owned banks) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.96 0.42 
Other 1.05 0.00 1.60 3.20 1.11 0.42 
Total 100.00 73.68 100.00 68.00 100.02 66.01 
Source: Author’s calculations with BEEPS 2002 dataset. 
